

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00362 01 OF 04 222105Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13  
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02  
SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 /094 W  
-----023050 222119Z /62

P R 221914Z JUN 78  
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2981  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USMISSION USNATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0362

FM US REP MBFR

E O 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JUNE 22 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 174TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS,  
WHICH WAS HELD ON JUNE 22, NETHERLANDS REP (DEVOS) AND  
GDR REP (OESER) DELIVERED THE ONLY FORMAL STATEMENTS.  
THE NETHERLANDS STATEMENT IS BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY.  
THE GDR STATEMENT WAS UNUSUAL IN THAT IT WAS DELIVERED  
AT ALL AT THIS SESSION SINCE, UNDER COMMON PRACTICE,  
THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN ONLY A WESTERN PLENARY SPEAKER  
THIS WEEK. (COMMENT: IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THE  
GDR STATEMENT WAS INTENDED TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR  
STIMULATING FURTHER PRESS PLAY FOR THE JUNE 8 EASTERN  
PROPOSALS. END COMMENT. )

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00362 01 OF 04 222105Z

2. SUBSTANTIVELY, THE GDR STATEMENT BROKE LITTLE  
NEW GROUND BUT WAS INTERESTING ON SEVERAL  
POINTS OF DETAIL AS REGARDS THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS.  
OESER DEPICTED THEM AS A MODIFICATION OF THE MORE  
AMBITIOUS EARLIER EASTERN PROGRAM MADE IN ORDER TO  
MEET WESTERN RELUCTANCE TO TAKE THE EXTENSIVE REDUC-

TIONS ENVISAGED IN THE LATTER. HE STRESSED THAT THE LATEST EASTERN MOVE WAS PREMISED ON THE EXISTING APPROXIMATELY EQUAL LEVELS OF EASTERN AND WESTERN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND ARMAMENTS, AND CONSEQUENTLY COMBAT CAPABILITY, WHICH, HE CLAIMED, CHARACTERIZED THE CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN THE AREA.

3. ON THE PROPOSALS THEMSELVES, THE GDR STATEMENT MADE CLEAR THAT THE EAST WAS PROPOSING A SEPARATE 200,000 MAN CEILING ON AIR FORCE PERSONNEL. FURTHER, OESER INDICATED THAT THE METHOD FOR STAGE II REDUCTIONS HAD PURPOSELY BEEN LEFT OPEN, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT SUCH REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE BY UNITS AND INCLUDE ARMAMENTS. GDR REP DEFENDED THE PROVISION WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE US OR USSR TO NULLIFY ITS STAGE I OBLIGATIONS IF DISSATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS OF STAGE II.

4. GDR REP MADE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE NATO LTDP IN ATTACKING WESTERN FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE REPEATED THE CLAIM THAT WARSAW PACT FORCES HAD NOT INCREASED AND WOULD NOT DO SO AND MENTIONED THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. OESER CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION BY STATING THAT THE NEXT MOVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS UP TO THE WEST.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00362 01 OF 04 222105Z

THE FOLLOWING IS AN INFORMAL DELEGATION TRANSLATION OF THE FULL TEXT OF OESER'S STATEMENT WHICH WAS DELIVERED IN GERMAN:

BEGIN TEXT:

1. THE NEW PROPOSALS TABLED BY THE SOCIALIST STATES ON THE 8TH OF JUNE OF THIS YEAR ARE A FAR-REACHING OFFER TO THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. THEY REFLECT THE STRIVING TO DO WHAT IS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO REACH PRACTICAL RESULTS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

2. AS A CO-AUTHOR OF THESE PROPOSALS, THE GDR, IN VIEW OF ITS LOCATION IN THE MIDDLE OF EUROPE ALONG THE LINE BETWEEN THE TWO MILITARY GROUPINGS, HAS A SPECIAL INTEREST IN STOPPING THE ARMS RACE AND IN THIS WAY TO DO AWAY WITH THE MILITARY CONCENTRATION AND TO DEEPEN DETENTE. SINCE ITS FOUNDING, THE GDR HAS, AS A PRECEPT OF ITS POLICY, NOT TO PERMIT A WAR TO START FROM GERMAN SOIL ONCE AGAIN. AS CALLED FOR IN THE UN CHARTER, THE SCOURGE OF WAR SHOULD NO LONGER THREATEN OTHER PEOPLE AND OUR OWN.

3. "WE PROPOSE, IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, TO COME TO SUCH AGREEMENTS THAT ARE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL SIDES." THIS IS A STATEMENT RECENTLY MADE BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY AND CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, ERICH HONECKER. HE STRESSED THAT QUOTE OUR PRINCIPLED APPROACH WAS AND REMAINS THE POLICY OF PEACE AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE BETWEEN STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL ORDERS. WE ARE CONVINCED PROPONENTS OF THE DEEPENING AND STRENGTHENING OF DETENTE. ALONG WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ALL OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH OF STATES, THE GDR SUPPORTS

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00362 02 OF 04 222113Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13  
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02  
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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2982  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USMISSION USNATO  
AMEMBASY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USNMR SHAPE  
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C O N I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0362

GENUINE STEPS IN DISARMAMENT TO SLOW DOWN THE ARMS RACE,  
TO DECREASE AND EVENTUALLY TO ELIMINATE THE DANGERS OF  
ATOMIC CATASTROPHY, THAT IS TODAY AN ESSENTIAL QUESTION  
FOR MANKIND. UNQUOTE.

4. THIS IS ALSO THE DEEPER MEANING OF THE NEW PROPOSALS  
OF THE SOCIALIST STATES. THE PROFF OF THEIR SERIOUS INTENT  
TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IS SHOWN BY THEIR  
READINESS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NUMEROUS ELEMENTS OF THE  
WESTERN POSITION.

5. IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS, IT HAS BECOME  
CLEAR THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THE WESTERN PARTICIPANT

STATES HAVE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WHILE THE USSR, THE CSSR, THE GDR AND THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, HAVE STRIVEN FROM THE VERY BEGINNING AND CONTINUE TO STRIVE TO REDUCE FORCES ON A MUTUAL BASIS, IN CONSIDERABLE SCOPE, AND  
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00362 02 OF 04 222113Z

EFFECTIVELY, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE NOT SHOWN SUCH READINESS. OUR STATES PROPOSE THAT THE GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BE REDUCED BY ABOUT 15-17 PCT IN THE FORM OF MILITARY FORMATIONS WITH ALL MAIN WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT. THE WESTERN STATES ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT SUCH A REDUCTION. THEIR FORMAT FOR REDUCTIONS WAS AND IS LIMITED:  
-- THEY DECLARE THEMSELVES TO BE READY TO REDUCE ONLY GROUND FORCES AND DO NOT AGREE TO EFFECTIVELY LIMIT THE PERSONNEL OF THE AIR FORCES;  
-- ORIGINALLY, THEY REFUSED ALTOGETHER TO REDUCE ARMAMENTS AND IN DECEMBER 1975 DECLARED THEMSELVES READY ONLY TO REDUCE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY MEANS AND 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS OF THE USA.  
-- THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA ARE STILL NOT PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS TO MAKE PROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS IN THEIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN A SECOND PHASE.  
-- THE MODIFICATIONS IN THEIR APPROACH IN APRIL OF THIS YEAR HARDLY CHANGES THIS FACT. ALTHOUGH THE WESTERN STATES HAVE ACCEPTED TO SET A MAXIMUM TIME LIMIT FOR THE REDUCTION, THEY DEVALUE THIS ACCEPTANCE BY REFUSING TO SET THE AMOUNT OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED BY EACH PARTICIPANT STATE.

5. THIS APPROACH IS ALSO VERY EVIDENT IN REGARD TO THE SCOPE OF MANPOWER REDUCTIONS. IN 1973, THE SOCIALIST STATES PROPOSED THAT THE GROUND AND AIR FORCES OF EACH OF THE MILITARY GROUPINGS CONSISTING TODAY OF ABOUT 980,000 MEN, BE REDUCED BY ABOUT 15-17 PCT, THAT IS ABOUT 150,000 - 170,000 MEN EACH. THE RESULT OF THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN THAT THE LEVEL OF MILITARY FORCES COULD ALREADY HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO AROUND  
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00362 02 OF 04 222113Z

800,000 MEN BY THE END OF 1977. HOWEVER, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ARE ONLY READY TO REDUCE THEIR GROUND FORCES BY 91,000 MEN INSTEAD OF THE 150,000 - 170,000 MEN REDUCTIONS IN GROUND AND AIR FORCES.

7. WHILE IN THE PAST YEARS THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE SUBMITTED VARIOUS COMPROMISE PROPOSALS, THE APPROACH OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAS NOT CHANGED. IN FACT OUTSIDE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THEY ARE CARRYING OUT A SYSTEMATIC BUILD-UP OF THEIR MILITARY FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE DECISIONS OF THE NATO COUNCIL MEETING IN WASHINGTON IN JUNE OF THIS YEAR, ARE THE BEST EVIDENCE OF THIS. THE LONG TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM WHICH WAS DECIDED UPON THERE COINCIDES WITH A QUANTITATIVE INCREASE OF NATO TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THAT IS A NEGATIVE REACTION TO THE BEHAVIOR OF THE SOCIALIST STATES WHICH HAVE NOT INCREASED THEIR FORCES AND, AS THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE CPU AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, LEONID BREZHNEV, DECLARED, HAVE NOT THE INTENTION OF INCREASING THEIR FORCES BY A SINGLE MAN OR A SINGLE TANK. OUR PROPOSAL TO AGREE ON A NON-INCREASE ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR THE DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THEREFORE REMAINS PERTINENT.

8. THE NEW PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE REALISTIC THEY ARE BASED ON THE APPROXIMATE MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE TALKING IN 1976 AND 1978 OF OFFICIAL FIGURES ON GROUND AND AIR FORCES AND THE

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00362 03 OF 04 222121Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13  
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02  
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-----023144 222125Z /61

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2983  
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INFO USMISSION USNATO  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USNMR SHAPE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0362

DATA DISCUSSION CONDUCTED ON THE BASIS OF THESE FIGURES CONFIRM THE VALIDITY OF THIS ASSESSMENT. THE APPROXIMATE MILITARY BALANCE IN THIS REGION IS CHARACTERIZED BY THE LEVEL OF MANPOWER, ARMAMENTS, AND THE RESULTING COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF BOTH MILITARY GROUPINGS.

9. THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES POINT THE WAY TO A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, TO FIRST PRACTICAL RESULTS IN REDUCTIONS. THEY CREATE THE POSSIBILITY TO MAKE PROGRESS AND REACH RESULTS IN VIENNA IN A SHORT TIME BECAUSE THEY ACCOMMODATE THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ON MANY POINTS:

1) IN VIEW OF THE REFUSAL OF THE WEST TO REDUCE THEIR AIR FORCES, THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE DECLARED THEMSELVES READY TO REDUCE ONLY GROUND FORCES. THEY HAVE AGREED TO FIX THE LEVEL OF THE GROUND FORCES OF BOTH MILITARY GROUPINGS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AT 700,000 MEN AND THE COMBINED GROUND AND AIR FORCE LEVEL AT 900,000 MEN FOR BOTH GROUPINGS. IN THIS THEY TAKE IT FOR CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00362 03 OF 04 222121Z

GRANTED THAT THE AIR FORCES ON EACH SIDE MAY NOT BE INCREASED ABOVE 200,000 MEN. 2) THE SOCIALIST STATES DECLARED THEMSELVES READY, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS OF FORCES BY ALL 11 DIRECT PARTICIPATING STATES AND THE SUBSEQUENT ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EQUAL COMMON CEILING, TO REDUCE THE GROUND FORCES OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS BY A TOTAL OF 91,000 MEN AND OF THE SOCIALIST STATES BY 105,000 MEN. 3) THEY AGREED THAT IN THE FIRST PHASE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REDUCE ITS GROUND FORCES BY ABOUT 30,000 MEN AND THE USA BY ABOUT 14,000 MEN. THAT IS ABOUT 7 PCT OF THE SIZE OF THEIR GROUND FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. SINCE OUR PROPOSALS CALL FOR A REDUCTION BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THEIR FORCES BY ABOUT 11-13 PERCENT, THIS MEANS THAT, THE USSR AS WELL AS THE USA REDUCE THEIR FORCES FURTHER IN A SECOND PHASE. THE DIVISION OF THEIR REDUCTION CONTRIBUTIONS INTO TWO PHASES IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. 4) IN THEIR PROPOSALS THE SOCIALIST STATES ALSO AGREED THAT IN THE FIRST PHASE THE USA REDUCE EXACTLY THOSE ARMAMENTS BEING OFFERED BY THEM SINCE DECEMBER 1975. THE SOVIET UNION DECLARES ITSELF READY TO REDUCE 1,000 BATTLE TANKS AS WELL AS 250 MECHANIZED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES. TWO DIVISIONS OF THE SOVIET FORCES WILL BE REDUCED IN THEIR FULL STRENGTH. THE REDUCTIONS IN THE FORM OF DIVISIONS COINCIDES WITH THE DESIRES OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. THIS PROVISION ALSO JUSTIFIES THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE USA ALSO

REDUCE LARGE FORMATIONS, NAMELY 2-3 BRIGADES, AS PART OF  
THE TOTAL SCOPE OF THE FORCES WHICH THEY MUST REDUCE. THE  
SOCIALIST STATES CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE REDUCTION OF ALL  
MAIN TYPES OF ARMAMENTS IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT FOR THE ALLEVIATION  
OF THE MILITARY CONFORNTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE  
REDUCTION BY SIMILAR TYPES OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO BE THE FAIREST  
AND MOST EFFECTIVE METHOD FOR SLOWING DOWN THE ARMS RACE AS  
WELL AS GUARANTEEING SECURITY. HOWEVER, IN THE INTEREST OF  
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00362 03 OF 04 222121Z

A RESULT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEY ALSO ACCOMMODATE THE WESTERN  
PARTICIPANTS IN THIS QUESTION. WITH PROPER POLITICAL WILL AND  
EARNEST STRIVING FOR DETENTE BY ALL PARTICIPANTS, PRACTICAL  
MEASURES FOR REDUCING ARMAMENTS THEREFORE BECOME POSSIBLE.  
5) THESE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE DECIDED TO AGREE TO A  
QUANTITATIVELY LARGER REDUCTION FOR SOVIET THAN AMERICAN  
FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE. THEY SEE BOTH REDUCTION PHASES  
AS ONE SINGLE PROCESS. THE RESULT MUST BE THE PRESERVATION

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00362 04 OF 04 222135Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13  
L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2984  
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AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0362

OF THE APPROXIMATE MILITARY BALANCE THROUGH INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION CONTRIBUTIONS BY EACH SINGLE PARTICIPANT PROPORTIONATE TO THE SCOPE OF HIS FORCES. SUCH A REDUCTION CONTRIBUTION ALSO DICTATES THAT THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS BESIDES THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USA REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS AND THAT THE METHOD OF THE REDUCTION OF THEIR TROOPS NOT DIFFER CONSIDERABLY FROM THE METHOD FORESEEN FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE TROOPS OF THE USSR AND THE USA IN THE FIRST PHASE. THIS CORRESPONDS TO THE AGREED GOAL OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. IT CORRESPONDS TO THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY TO PRESERVE THE APPROXIMATE MILITARY BALANCE SO THAT PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE ARE NOT ONLY SECURE BUT ALSO STRENGTHENED.

10. THE SOCIALIST STATES DECLARE THEMSELVES READY TO POSTPONE FIXING THE METHOD OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE SECOND PHASE UNTIL THE NEGOTIATION FOR THAT PHASE. HOWEVER, WE MUST HAVE ASSURANCE THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00362 04 OF 04 222135Z

SECOND PHASE OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS WILL ALSO SEE EFFECTIVE EQUAL REDUCTIONS SO THAT THE GREATER REDUCTIONS ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FIRST PHASE DO NOT IMPAIR THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES.

11. THE FIXING OF THE METHOD OF REDUCTIONS OF GROUND FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE SECOND PHASE IS NOT PREDETERMINED. THE RIGHT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USA TO NULLIFY THEIR PHASE I REDUCTIONS, IN CASE NO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ABOUT PHASE II REDUCTIONS IS REACHED AND THE METHOD OF TROOP AND ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IS OBVIOUSLY UNSATISFACTORY, IS A JUSTIFIED SECURITY MEASURE. THE INCLUSION OF SUCH A MEASURE IN OUR PROPOSALS IS ALL THE MORE JUSTIFIED BECAUSE, IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS, IT IS PRECISELY THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA WHO HAVE CONTINUOUSLY AVOIDED THE CLEAR DETERMINATION OF THEIR REDUCTION CONTRIBUTIONS.

12. MR. CHAIRMAN:

13. THE PROPOSALS OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANT SOCIALIST STATES OF 8 JUNE PERMIT US TO REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT IMMEDIATELY. THIS IS DUE TO THEIR REALISTIC PREMISE, WHICH FULLY AND COMPLETELY CORRESPONDS TO THE MUTUAL GOAL OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, TO STRENGTHEN PEACE IN EUROPE AND BRING ABOUT A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP. THEY ARE BASED ON THE AGREED PRINCIPLES AND DECISIONS OF 28 JUNE 1973.

14. A CONSTRUCTIVE ANSWER BY THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO OUR FAR REACHING COMPROMISES WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE THE REACHING



OF PRACTICAL SUCCESSES IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL  
REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. MAYBE WE SHOULD  
EMPHASIZE ONCE MORE: NOT ONLY THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE OBLIGED  
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00362 04 OF 04 222135Z

TO REFLECT AND EVENTUALLY TO FIND ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISES TO  
BRING ABOUT PROGRESS. THIS APPLIES AT LEAST EQUALLY TO THE  
WESTERN PARTICIPANT STATES. OUR PROPOSALS PERMIT US TO FIND  
A COMMON DENOMINATOR. WHAT IS NECESSARY, HOWEVER, IS TO GIVE  
UP ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGES IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

15. WE WISH TO STRESS ONE MORE THE SOCIALIST  
STATES, AS SHOWN BY THEIR NEW PROPOSALS, ARE READY TO DO  
THE UTMOST TO FINALLY BRING ABOUT A BREAKTHROUGH IN THE  
NEGOTIATIONS, TO BRING ABOUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.  
THE TIMES CALL FOR ACTION. RAPID RESULTS ARE NECESSARY IN  
THE INTEREST OF PEACE AND DETENTE. ALL MUST CONTRIBUTE TO  
THIS. THEREFORE, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS NOW HAVE THE FLOOR.  
END TEXT. RESOR

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## Message Attributes

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**To:** STATE DOD  
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